



‘A Weariness of the Flesh’: Towards a Theology of Bredom and Fatigue 
 Kenneth Jason Wardley 
Introduction 
It may seem odd – perverse even – to include an essay on boredom and fatigue in a 
book subtitled the ‘affirmation of life’. And yet they are part of our everyday lives1: 
fatigue, as Jean-Louis Chrétien has suggested, is one of the fundamental phenomena of 
existence, implicating not only a person’s work and bo y, but its temporality, death, 
meaning and being.2 And while English-speaking commentators may contend that the 
word ‘boredom’ is an invention of the nineteenth century (a product of either the 
Enlightenment or Romanticism), they also acknowledge that the French ennui ‘in all its 
metaphysical dignity’ originated in the twelfth century.3 
French studies of boredom are certainly more elegiac, perhaps because they 
associate boredom with depression4 – what the poet Baudelaire called ‘the planes of 
Ennui, vacant and profound’. At the start of the twentieth century French philosophy 
exhibited a divided and dialectical character: a philosophy of life on the one hand, a 
philosophy of the concept on the other. At stake, Alain Badiou suggests, was the human 
subject as a ‘living organism’ and ‘creator of concepts’ with both its ‘interior, animal, 
                                                 
1 Jean-Yves Lacoste, Présence et parousie (Genève: Ad Solem, 2006), p. 317. 
2 Jean-Louis Chrétien, De La Fatigue (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1996). 
3 Patricia Meyer Spacks, Boredom: The Literary History of a State of Mind (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), p. 9, 14. 
4 Peter Toohey, Boredom: A Lively History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 201. Cf. 
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organic life,’ and ‘capacity for creativity and abstraction’ under scrutiny.5 As Badiou 
observes, this ‘relationship between body and idea, or life and concept, formulated 
around the question of the subject, thus structures th  whole development’ of twentieth-
century French philosophy.6 
Indeed, Jean-Luc Marion argues that the supernatural bo edom which ‘turns the 
spiritual away from the good … away from charity’7 also ‘undoes being from its very 
beingness’ and ‘abolishes the very name of being’.8 Conversely, rather than this 
disengagement of ontological difference, Emmanuel Levinas observed that fatigue is 
‘not a cancellation of one’s contract with being’9 but the opportunity for an 
‘interrogation of being’.10 Instead, understood as ‘some lapse or diminishment in our 
capacity to go on’11 fatigue is probably our most common form of experience, one 
which happens so frequently and closely to humanity that it can often escape proper 
reflection and understanding.  
Such familiarity, I suggest, has though, until recently, bred philosophical 
neglect, while in theology the very idea that God might be something we are tired of – 
or even bored by – seems blasphemous. Indeed, as the phenomenologist and theologian 
                                                 
5 Alain Badiou, ‘The Adventure of French Philosophy’, New Left Review 35 (2005): p. 69. 
6 Ibid., p. 69. 
7 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1991), p. 135. 
8 Ibid., p. 120. 
9 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 2001), p. 25. 
10 Chrétien, De La Fatigue, p. 12. 
11 Jeffrey Bloechl, ‘The difficulty of being: A partial reading of E. Lévinas, De l’existence à l’existant’, 




Jean-Yves Lacoste notes, in the history of ideas what as usually referred to as wisdom 
was in fact the ‘life of the mind’ or the ‘vitality of the spirit’. By contrast, Lacoste 
continues, fatigue is often defined as f ilure, a closing off of ourselves from the world.12 
Theological claims that the God to whom humanity prays is tirelessly13 concerned with 
the world come to naught if I am so bored that I cannot pray well, or if I am so tired that 
I cannot pray at all.  
This essay will thus follow two impulses: Lacoste’s suggestion that philosophy 
and theology should speak about boredom and about fatigue, just as they do about 
anguish or joy, and the Swiss theologian Karl Barth’s contention that theological 
anthropology and philosophy of religion are incoherent without them. Above all, it will 
try and offer a tentative answer to the question as to what it means to pray when one is 
tired or bored. To this end, I shall begin by examining some of the traditional 
theological and philosophical readings of fatigue and boredom (beginning with Jewish 
and Christian scripture), before turning specifically to Martin Heidegger and Giorgio 
Agamben, and finally to recent phenomenological accounts, drawing from them some 
suggestions for a possible theology of boredom and f tigue. 
The Theological Status of Fatigue and Boredom 
Both Thomas Aquinas14 and the desert fathers understood the dangers of apathy 
[accidia], or a lack of interest in spiritual matters. But while the author of Ecclesiastes 
offered a warning to every theologian that ‘of making books there is no end, and much 
                                                 
12 Lacoste, Présence et parousie, p. 311. 
13 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, ‘On unceasing prayer’, trans. William Morlock, Communio, 4/2 (1977):  
pp. 99-113. 
14 Summa Theologica II/2, q.35, art.4, ‘Reply to objection 3.’ Cited in Michael L. Raposa, Boredom and 




study is a weariness of the flesh’,15 the biblical witness is for the most part silent o the 
topic of boredom,16 with the prophet Isaiah (Is. 40: 28-31) typifying scriptural attitudes 
to fatigue. The Gospels at least offer some solace for weary souls (and theologians a 
space for contemplation and investigation17) revealing that even the incarnate God was 
himself tired from his journey (John 4:6). Elsewhere the Gospels record a specific type 
of boredom, arising from a jadedness born of excess and repetition (or what Svendsen 
terms the ‘boredom of satiety’18): is this what befalls the disciples in Mark 14: 32-42 as 
Christ prays in the Garden of Gethsemane? 
As scriptural commentary, Lo Spagna’s painting of The Agony in the Garden 
(1500-1505) certainly gives that impression: it depicts three drowsy disciples, their 
heads resting on their forearms (a position which Toohey considers ‘a sign of 
boredom’19). Now, the disciples ought not to be bored and sleepy – they ought to be 
‘full of attention and prayerful devotion. But they have had enough of their Easter 
service and this terrible garden. Their dereliction … is expressed as boredom with the 
travails of their Saviour’20 and Toohey applauds Lo Spagna’s genius in adding ‘this 
boredom to the usual depiction’ of the sleepy disciples in Gethsemane. 
Now, as evocative as this is, it is probably an exeg tical stretch. More damning 
is an incident from the career of the Apostle Paul (who commands us to pray 
unceasingly in 1 Thessalonians) in which we learn that a young man, Eutychus, sank 
                                                 
15 Ecclesiastes 12:12. 
16 Although Proverbs 31:27 describes an ideal wife as one who ‘avoids the bread of idleness’. 
17 Chrétien, De La Fatigue, p. 13. 
18 Lars Svendsen, A Philosophy of Boredom, trans. John Irons (London: Reaktion, 2005), p. 41. 
19 Toohey, Boredom, p. 13. 




‘into a deep sleep as Paul talked on and on’ until, ‘sound asleep, he fell to the ground 
from the third storey … dead’21. This, one might suggest, is the first recorded incident 
in the history of the Christian church in which a me ber of the congregation is bored to 
death by the preaching; a cautionary tale of a preach r who drones on until the service 
becomes an all-nighter and ‘vespers has turned into a lock-in.’22 No wonder then, that it 
is usually passed over by embarrassed Biblical commentators.23  
Echoing the author of Ecclesiastes, in his commentary on Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans, Karl Barth talked about the flourishing business of in with ‘the publication of 
books such as the one I am now writing’.24 For Barth, writing in the wake of the First 
World War, ‘the signature of modern man’ seemed to consist ‘simply and unfortunately 
in his utter weariness and boredom … man is bored with himself’.25 Modern man, Barth 
avers, ‘can no longer work up any interest in himself, or give himself to the stimuli and 
disillusionments of seeking and self-transcendence’. H  thus reacts ‘neither positively 
nor negatively to his experience, however intense’ and is incapable ‘of the joys of faith 
or of the fierceness of atheistic defiance. Everything has become a burden to him. He 
has attained only to the indifference which lets things take their course’. For Barth such 
                                                 
21 Acts 20:7-12. 
22 Anna Carter Florence, ‘A Prodigal Preaching Story and Bored-to-Death Youth’, Theology Today, 64/2 
(2007): p. 238. 
23 Those that do normally skip to Eutychus’ resurrection, glossing over the fact that Paul was at least 
partly culpable. One of the few references to this incident notes, archly, that ‘If this was not his fir t and 
his only sermon at Troas, it was certainly his last.’ Alexander Whyte, Bible Characters: Stephen to 
Timothy (Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, 1901), p. 43. 
24 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 
1933), p. 174. 




lethargy was ‘a pressing reality’ in post-war Europe; the ‘fateful question’ was whether 
Europe would succeed ‘in shaking [it] off’.26 
His study of human phenomena in part leads Barth to e rejection of the 
existential thought that characterised his early theology27: here ‘the religious 
interpretation of human life obviously reaches its limit’. Boredom is immanence in ‘its 
purest form’28. Yet the assertion that human life is related to transcendence: 
presupposes that man is interested in himself, that he is not weary of himself but in search of his 
true self ... [I]s it fair to take account of the enthusiasm which is able either to affirm or to deny 
the mystery suggested, but to ignore the lethargy which may also be a reaction in this situation, 
leaving out of account the tired and indifferent man, s though there could be no place for him 
too, and for him precisely, in a coherent anthropolgy?29 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 117. 
27 Cf. Stephen H. Webb, Re-figuring Theology: The Rhetoric of Karl Barth (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1991), p. 153. However, the French ‘theology of work’ which emerged in the 1950s 
amounted to little more than a ‘theology of pious consciousness’ that ignored pressing socio-ethical 
problems; the papal encyclical Laborem exercens recognised only that man rest in order to ‘prepare 
himself, becoming more and more what in the will of God he ought to be’. On Human Work 
(Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1981), p. 25. See Lothar Roos, ‘On a theology and 
ethics of work’, trans. Albert K. Wimmer, Communio, 11/2 (1984): pp. 100-119. 
28 Svendsen, Philosophy of Boredom, p. 47. 
29 Barth continues: ‘Is not this unfairness a further indication that it is not quite correct to maintai that 
the frontier situation is laden with transcendence or that this is genuine transcendence? Is it not a further 
indication of the highly problematical nature of the main principle of this philosophy?’ Church 




And not just existentialist philosophy; systematic theology itself, Barth suggested, was 
‘the turning over of a sick man in his bed for the sake of change’.30 What one generation 
found interesting will likely bore the next; 31as Stephen Webb notes, theology, ‘because 
it must speak from the emptiness of human life, is always seeking something new to 
say, a newness that Barth suggests can only barely cover up its profound ennui’.32 Even 
the relatively mundane activity of weekly preaching falters: ‘The people do not need us 
to help them with the paraphernalia [appurtenances] of their daily life’, writes Barth,33 
thus exposing the embarrassing conceptual myopia behind Schleiermacher’s definition 
of religion as a ‘taste for the infinite’ or a ‘feeling of ultimate dependence’ [Gefühl 
schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit] which has plagued the philosophy of religion ever since. 
The Temporality of Boredom 
Similar sentiments were echoed by Edmund Husserl, writing in 1936 that ‘the 
exclusiveness with which the total world-view of modern man, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the positive sciences and be blinded by 
the “prosperity” they produced, meant an indifferent turning-away from the questions 
which are decisive for a genuine humanity’.34 Barth’s comments were directed in part at 
                                                 
30 Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1928), p. 184. 
31 Jacques Ellul identified boredom – ‘gloomy, dull, and joyless’ – as one of the defining perversions of 
modern social life. Violence: Reflections from a Christian Perspective, trans. Cecilia Gaul Kings 
(London: SCM Press, 1970), p. 121. 
32 Webb, Re-figuring Theology, p. 134. 
33 Barth, Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 187. 
34 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David 




Husserl’s pupil, Martin Heidegger. While the phenomenological analysis which 
Heidegger had offered in Being and Time had centred on anxiety, in his winter semester 
1929-30 lecture course it was replaced by boredom as the basic mood of Dasein. 
Boredom here means literally a ‘long while’ [Langeweile] and, Heidegger asks, ‘who is 
not acquainted with it in the most varied forms anddisguises in which it arises, in the 
way it often befalls us only for a moment, the way it torments and depresses us for 
longer periods too’.35 
This German term conveys the temporal aspect of the exp rience, one in which 
‘the imagination is crucified’;36 if time does become intolerably ‘long’ for Dasein37 then 
it tries to drive that time and its boring character away with petty distractions. Dasein 
simply does not wish to experience a ‘long time’: 
Such boredom is still distant when it is only this book or that play, that business or this idleness, 
that drags on and on. It irrupts when “one is bored”. Profound boredom, drifting here and there 
in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and human beings and 
oneself along with them into a remarkable indifferenc . This boredom manifests beings as a 
whole.38 
                                                 
35 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 79. 
36 Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, p. 40. 
37 As Agamben observes, Heidegger’s locus classicus is that of waiting on a railway platform. Giorgio 
Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 
63; Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 101. 
38 ‘No matter how fragmented our everyday existence may appear to be, however, it always deals with 
beings in a unity of the “whole,” if only in a shadowy way. Even and precisely when we are not actually 




Heidegger asks how might ‘we escape this boredom, in wh ch we find, as we ourselves 
say, that ime becomes drawn out, becomes long?’ His response is simply ‘by at all 
times making an effort, whether consciously or uncons iously, to pass the time, by 
welcoming highly important and essential preoccupations for the sole reason that they 
take up our time.’39 Heidegger, like Kierkegaard and Pascal, considered boredom to be a 
fundamental human ‘attunement’40 with ‘profound metaphysical, if not explicitly 
religious, significance’.41 These attunements are not ‘merely subjectively coloured 
experiences or epiphenomenal manifestations of psychological life’ but fundamental 
modes of being, ‘ways of Dasein in which Dasein becomes manifest to itself’.42 Such 
powerful habits of feeling shape our perceptions of the world, and Heidegger was 
concerned with finding a way to make our boredom ‘resonate’ rather than allowing it 
only to manifest itself ‘wherever we create a diversion from boredom for ourselves’.43 
This boredom is rooted in an experience of emptiness – what Raposa calls the 
‘emptiness of each passing moment, as well as that of the object that confronts us and of 
the situation that binds us’.44 This overpowering feeling, that in boredom ‘we arebound 
precisely by – nothing’,45 that is, ‘not bound by time but by the emptiness of this 
                                                                                                                                     
Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’ in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 87. 
39 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 78. 
40 Ibid., pp. 77-79. 
41 Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, p. 54. 
42 Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 238. 
43 Ibid., p. 90. 
44 Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, p. 55. 




time’,46 becomes clearer in Heidegger’s intensification of boredom as more than simply 
being ‘bored by’ a particular object or activity. Anxiety and boredom constitute a state 
of mind that is both a kind of calmness and an uneasi ss that ‘leaves us hanging, 
because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole’.47 ‘Profound boredom’ as a 
state of detachment and indifference provides a ‘vehicl  of transcendence’48 beyond 
specific circumstances and particular beings, one which ‘manifests being as a whole’. 
This reading of boredom as a state in which we might be open to the demand of Being 
has been challenged by Jean-Luc Marion, who points ut that it is more likely that it is a 
state in which we are unable to say anything at all, in which every call or claim 
(including that of Being itself) is disqualified: ‘boredom does not evaluate, does not 
affirm, does not love’.49  Indeed, the only other possibility of such revelation, Heidegger 
concedes, is ‘the joy we feel in the presence of the Dasein … of a human being whom 
we love’.50 
The Bored Animal 
One should then ask the question of whether boredom is ‘affect’ or ‘affect-lessness’. 
These preoccupations testify to ‘being-left-empty as the essential experience of 
                                                 
46 Raposa, Boredom and the Religious Imagination, p. 55 (emphasis in the original). 
47 Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’ p. 88. 
48 Ibid., p. 57. 
49 Jean-Luc Marion, Reduction and Givenness, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), p. 190. For an incisive critical discussion of Marion, see Joeri Schrijvers, 
Ontotheological Turnings: The Decentering of the Modern Subject in Recent French Pheneomenology 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), pp. 159-178. 




boredom’51and Giorgio Agamben’s own reading of Heidegger (developing the notion of 
‘profound boredom’ [tiefe Langeweile]) assigns it the privileged role of ‘metaphysical 
operator’52 in the anthropological ‘machine’ which produces – and thereby separates – 
humanity from animality.53 Boredom is the keynote of ‘anthropogenesis, the becoming 
Da-sein of living man’54 suspending its animal captivation with its habitual stimuli 
(what Agamben calls the ‘carriers of significance which constitute its environment’55). 
‘Dasein,’ concludes Agamben ‘is simply an animal tht as learned to become bored’.56 
What separates us from the animals is our awareness of tedium, both the tedium of 
having nothing particular to occupy us, and the tediousness of what does, and which 
might enable us, however briefly, to forget how much we are restrained by our habits. 
Boredom exposes ‘the unexpected proximity of Dasein and the animal’57: both are 
‘open to a closedness ... totally delivered over to something that obstinately refuses 
itself’58; nonetheless this non-relation ultimately leads to an estrangement from our 
                                                 
51Agamben, The Open, p. 64.  
52 Ibid., p. 68. 
53 In Animal boredom: towards an empirical approach of animal subjectivity (Leiden, 1993), François 
Wemelsfelder offers an account from the perspective of physical sciences (although one still drawing 
upon Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), suggesting that animals and humans participate in a common pre-
reflective environment [Umwelt]. 
54 Agamben, The Open, p. 68. 
55 Ibid., p. 41. 
56 ‘... it has awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation. This awakening of the living being 
to its own being-captivated, this anxious and resolute opening to a not-open, is the human.’ Ibid., p. 70. 
57 Ibid., p. 65. 
58 ‘In boredom, Dasein can be riveted to beings that refuse themselves in their totality because it is 




environment.59 And yet this anthropology remains incoherent: disaffection is not simply 
the absence of affection. It has an object: people are disaffected with something or by 
something; in this sense, as we shall note later on, it has the same structure as fatigue. 
While Agamben’s ‘weak messianicity’ articulates an ‘o tology of potentiality’, fatigue 
– to which we now turn – remains a neglected theme of Agamben’s post human bio-
politics.60 
The Phenomenology of Fatigue 
Chretien’s thesis is simple: ‘ever since we came into the world we have always found 
(or lost) ourselves in this familiar but immemorial ordeal’.61 We are tested by fatigue, in 
one or other of its many forms, every day. Fatigue is a constant part of the fabric of 
human lives and accompanies all of its activities: exhaustion represents an extreme form 
of fatigue, intelligible only according to that tiredness of which one has prior 
experience. It is, therefore, a sign of solidarity, the condition of our living and our 
humanity; experienced [donné] as both indivisible and yet infinitely varied: ‘ev n if 
philosophical analysis62 could distinguish (or even resist) the fatigue of the body and 
lassitude of the soul, that is not for us the beginning of the fatigue ... which weighs upon 
                                                                                                                                     
the world of its concern … In becoming bored, Dasein is delivered over (ausgeliefert) to something that 
refuses itself, exactly as the animal, in its captivation, is exposed (hinausgesetzt) in something 
unrevealed.’  Agamben, The Open, p. 65 (emphasis in original). 
59 The ‘jewel ... at the center of the human world ... is nothing but animal captivation’. Ibid., p.68. 
60 Neither Homo Sacer, The Open or Means without End make any reference to fatigue. 
61 Chrétien, De La Fatigue, p. 9. 
62 Lacoste himself describes the task of the philosopher as ‘that of an ascetic … but this work has nothi g 




our actions, our feet and our faces, nor the sheer physical effort that plunges us into 
some stupor or bewilderment.’ 63 
Since fatigue thus lies in the background of every activity, it is there in idleness 
too (one can get tired of doing nothing – ‘each act has its own fatigue’). Chretien’s 
genealogical investigation asks whether it is always the same tiredness, or does it have a 
history, even a destiny? Is the history of fatigue, in fact, not the history of the body? It is 
one of the most humane, common and enduring experienc s; intimate, unspectacular 
and unobjectifiable, present at the heart of each human life, affecting both body and 
soul. But, according to Lacoste, the marks of fatigue upon the body remind us that it is 
also a self. And with this in mind, one can understand the philosophical meaning of 
fatigue. Whenever someone says that they are tired they do not mean that their body is 
tired,64 or that certain physical-chemical processes have tired them: they mean that, 
above all, fatigue has an egological reality. Now, this does not mean that animals are 
never tired, nor does it suggest that they have an go; it simply reminds us that once 
again consciousness and the body are inseparable.65 Indeed, for Lacoste, dreamless 
sleep reveals the irreducible animality of human life.66 
Boredom and Life 
                                                 
63 Chrétien, De La Fatigue, p. 9. 
64 Of course one might ‘challenge the impression that being must be either actively engaged in what 
Levinas calls “effort” or else in some state of decel ration or decline. This division seems to overlook the 
humble experience of leisure, of being at one’s ease.’ Bloechl, ‘The difficulty of being’, p. 85. Cf. Jean-
Yves Lacoste, Le monde et l’absence d’œuvre (Paris: PUF, 2000), pp. 18-21. 
65 Jean-Yves Lacoste, Etre-en-Danger (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2011), p. 243. 




Phenomenology maintains that ‘things are endowed with meaning and value only 
through the comportment adopted toward them and in accordance with how such things 
appear to the subject.’67 One should ask then what the significance of boredom and 
fatigue is. 
Merleau-Ponty, who like Husserl understood the importance of embodiment,68 
contended that attentiveness was crucial to consciou ness.69 On the other hand, in 
examining our affective lives Lacoste wishes to prese ve the ‘formal plurality’ in which 
the world appears including inattentiveness, disappointment and boredm. Like 
Gethsemane, there should be no time for boredom: the desideratum (longing) for God 
supersedes the sort of temporary ‘micro-eschatology’ 70 of peace or the rest that Levinas 
                                                 
67 Jean-Luc Petit, 'Constitution by movement: Husserl in light of recent neurobiological findings' in Jean 
Petitot (ed.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science 
(Stanford, 1999), p. 221. 
68 Our bodies are ‘given as the constant bearer of the center of orientation’. Edmund Husserl, Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomelogical Philosophy: Second Book: Studies in 
the Phenomenology of Constitution, (Collected Works Vol. 3) trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André 
Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989), p. 70. 
69 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 
30. 
70 Lacoste (here borrowing a term from Richard Kearney), Etre-en-Danger, p. 283. See: Richard Kearney 
‘Epiphanies of the Everyday: Toward a Micro-Eschatology’, in After God: Richard Kearney and the 
Religious Turn in Continental Philosophy, ed. John Panteleimon Manoussakis (New York: Fordham 




found somewhat ridiculous.71 Nonetheless, this play between rest and restlessnes  is one 
of our most commonplace experiences. 
In his own analysis of the affective life, Lacoste ates unequivocally that ‘the 
experience of fatigue … is not pathological: a tired person is not a sick person (even if 
the distinction is often not that clear).’72 Often ‘[f]atigue is defined as failure’ when I 
cannot read or pay attention to whatever I am supposed to be listening to. Fatigue can be 
described in terms of opening and closing: openness, because it is ‘my exposure to 
certain things or events in the world which tires me’; closure, because it is ‘the refusal 
of that opening that is called fatigue’. One of thepurest examples of fatigue, offered by 
Lacoste, is the desire to sleep: ‘if not for fatigue I would be dead to the world ... In such 
a case, I would be tired. But the world would be only incidental for exhaustion ... 
[nevertheless] it is the same world which appears to me in my tired state as in … my 
rested or relaxed state.’73 Fatigue and boredom thereby reveal the incipient structuralism 
of daily life; fatigue has directionality: 
I am of course tired of this or that, of having read the Critique of Pure Reason or having had too 
long a hike,74 but the tiring thing (or tiring action) has the remarkable phenomenological 
property of affecting every other occurrence. The Critique of Pure Reason tires me. But during 
                                                 
71 ‘Mortality renders senseless any concern that the ego would have for its existence and its destiny … 
nothing is more comical than the concern that a being has for an existence that it could not save from its 
destruction’. Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2002), pp.  128-9. 
72 Lacoste, Présence et parousie, p. 310. 
73 Ibid., p. 311. 
74 Lacoste may here be making an implicit reference to Jean-Paul Sartre’s own discussion in Being and 
Nothingness: An Essay On Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London: Methuen, 




the act when it tires me (and, of course, in that act alone – I will always be able to do something 
different and allow the world to appear to me differently), it is the whole world, in its totality – 
and this is the important point – which tires me.75 
It is axiomatic that ‘[t]he experience of fatigue is the daily bread of prayer’: the spiritual 
life represents a costly break in our being-in-the-world. So is fatigue simply ‘a 
reclamation of man’ by the secular world? Lacoste admits that we might easily believe 
that – after all, it is not necessary for us to be tired to discover that prayer is difficult. 
The place which defines us does not necessarily incude any ad esse Deum (‘being 
towards God’) but it does unfold as corporeality, as flesh and spirit, and this corporeity 
is characterized as a closure on itself as much as by it  openness to the world. This 
closure might be the autonomy [adséité] of the transcendental ego or it may be the 
tension between the pray-er [orant] to cope with their ‘thoughts’, the logismoi of the 
ascetic tradition. Whichever it is, it is important that we can name this ‘heaviness’ or 
‘embarrassment’76 and the two experiences – of prayer and of fatigue – ‘should be 
linked ... in order to better illumine this relationship’.77 In other words, ‘[w]e must learn 
to pray in times of fatigue ... It is especially important – and this is where our emphasis 
should focus – to learn that it is in time of fatigue that we really pray’.78  
Fatigue characterizes the dispossession of the self wh n subjectivity is bracketed 
out in and by the world. And yet, fatigue presents ob tacles: ‘The heavy gestures of he 
                                                 
75  Lacoste, Présence et parousie, p. 311. 
76 Ibid., pp. 315-6. 
77 ‘By “prayer”, we understand a way of life/existenc (if we take “life/existence” within its current 
Kierkergaardian meaning), or more-than-existence (if we take “life” in the sense of Heideggerian 
analytic), being before God, esse coram Deo.’ Ibid. p. 314. 




who is not master of his own body. The voice that stumbles over its words. And other 
mundane realities. But there is more. It follows that the body is too tired to pray 
“well”’. 79 
Nihilism and Affection 
For Friedrich Nietzsche such fatigue and exhaustion were the chief exports and essential 
characteristics of the Christian faith,80 so much so that the highest goal of Europeans 
was ‘wakefulness itself’.81 The ‘will-to-power’ thus represented an epistemological 
principle whereby Nietzsche intended to ‘construct a philosophy consistent with the 
extraordinary openness he felt was available to man’82 in opposition to the 
‘transcendental nihilistic fatigue’ of which Christianity was merely the most radical 
form.83  
But, contends Levinas, the subject cannot be described merely on the basis of 
intentionality, freedom and will; it has to be described on ‘the basis of the passivity of 
time’.84 The patience of ageing is ‘not a position taken with regard to one’s death, but a 
lassitude, a passive exposure to being which is not assumed … that peculiar “being too 
much” which is also a failing but in a deficiency in which the conatus (impulse) is not 
relaxed’. Moreover, the non-repose or restlessness of the ethical concern implicit in 
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‘being for another’ is ‘better than rest’ and ‘bears witness to the Good’.85 However, 
Lacoste reminds us that since nothing is given to us without first being reduced to that 
which we can receive of that gift, then being is constantly in danger: ‘A human being is 
flesh and body, and this duality puts it in danger of being treated merely as a body: for 
instance, the surgeon is only concerned with a body, the flesh being somehow 
anesthetized – he would operate on an animal in the same way’.86 Thus, as well as 
letting things appear ‘we can also allow [them] to disappear. Reduced to an object by 
distractions, the work of art disappears. Reduced to a body, the anesthetized flesh 
disappears. Our being-at-rest disappears when we find ourselves without a place in the 
world’.87 Nihilism – in its reduction of truth88 to the will-to-power – diminishes the 
importance of place. Lacoste invites us to rethink our humanity by refiguring place, and 
how our comportment as ‘liturgical beings’ – beings before God89 – might exceed our 
being in the world. 
The simple thesis behind Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel was that Enlightenment 
modernity was the product of a neoscholastic theology which overlooked humanity’s 
natural desire for God leading to ‘a conception of grace as something so totally 
extraneous and alien to human nature that anything and everything natural and human 
was downgraded and demeaned’.90 That meant that human nature – including reason, 
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feeling, and the body – became ‘temptingly easy to denigrate’.91 Lacoste concedes that 
the concept of ‘pure nature’ probably ‘died from the rebuttal inflicted upon it by 
Lubac’.92 But does that mean that it became merely a chapter in he history of 
theological nonsense with nothing to tell us? According to Lacoste, the history of 
modern philosophy will, in fact, turn out to be nothing more than the history of 
philosophers’ inability ‘to grasp an object (the humanity of mankind93) that “natural 
reason” is, in principle, sufficient to grasp’.94 The idea of a pure nature – with all its 
attendant epistemological implications – is a modern hypothesis, a product of the 
division of theology and philosophy into ‘separate bodies’.  
Lacoste’s own phenomenological analysis is interestd in the margins of 
language, what he calls ‘the pre-discursive gift of the world to the self’95. This priority 
of the affective-corporeal dimension involves a privileging of the corporeal and 
topological register of experience as offering possibilities of human freedom that 
precede and exceed the merely conceptual or discursve. This represents a freedom from 
ontotheological language, a freedom in which human subjectivity is revealed as much at 
the level of passive syntheses such as disappointment or frustration as the perceptive life 
of which they are a part. These affections may overwh lm our perceptive life: when 
something appears to us, it is given to be both seen and felt (sensory hulè and 
intentional morphé) and the joy of seeing (or feeling) is all part of the composition of 
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that experience. That something affects us, which means that it is present to us. Yet, 
while we are enjoying its presence, tiredness overcomes us – that something is still there 
and is still perceived, but it is no longer present. And nothing is more common, Lacoste 
suggests, ‘than to allow oneself to invest in a presence, only to let that which was 
present to then absent itself’.96 
This affective flux not only recalls Heidegger’s emphasis on the pre-reflective 
dimension of existence but is, in part, reminiscent of Lubac’s own claim that our minds 
rest on a certain ‘anticipation’, or p olepsis97 that there is a truth ‘which is lived before 
it is known, perceived with certainty before being subjected to the discipline of proofs 
and the control of concepts – because it is connatural to us’.98 And as Levinas observes, 
‘human labor and effort presuppose a commitment in which we already involved’.99 But 
while the non-appearing divine may be perceptible through an affective act of 
mediation,100 the orant still risks boredom. Regardless of any proleptic, eschatology 
reminds us that God (or the Absolute) cannot easily be brought to mind in prayer, which 
may be destined only to be frustrated. Lacoste wishes simply to articulate ‘a possibility 
of a beyond-the-world in which nothing could be reduced to an object, in which flesh 
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could be bracketed out to the benefit of the body, a world beyond, therefore, in which 
being would not be being-in-danger. Such eschatology is a possibility, and thus not 
necessarily wishful thinking’.101  
Boredom thus provides a measure of how liturgical experience is, above all, a 
non-experience (one that undermines conventional accounts of ‘religious experience’ 
since Schleiermacher), that cannot be prescribed, rooted in something besides the 
intentionality of consciousness. Despite the claims of certain theological texts,102 
Lacoste maintains, it is impossible to apprehend Govia an act of the will or the 
intellect, here recalling Schelling and Kierkegaard, philosophers who transgressed the 
border between philosophical and theological reason in favour of a rationality that 
bypassed the opposition of natural and the supernatural in the interest of a vision of 
human freedom. But while philosophy can be concerned with human happiness it does 
not follow that it possesses the necessary conditios f r beatitude; although most claim 
to understand ‘well-being’, Lacoste notes wryly that philosophies such as logical 
positivism do not present themselves as lifestyles.103 And it remains fascinated by 
happiness even when this ‘well-being’ no longer has a divine warrant once philosophy 
asserts – following Nietzsche – that God is dead. As an example of this ‘right to the 
philosophical life’, Lacoste suggests Heidegger’s notion of ‘serenity’104 in which human 
beings enjoy everything that is their due, untroubled by anything that might exceed their 
‘ontological requirements’. This existential logic is thus one of satiety: humanity’s 
desire can be filled because it lives in an intelligib e world. And because it wants to 
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achieve those goals it has given itself the power to do so; the figure of the will which 
creates that power has its own name: the will-to-power, in reality a closed human 
experience. 
This will-to-power was an ‘all inclusive principle for Nietzsche’,105 
encompassing ontology, axiology, anthropology and epist mology. So, does the split 
between philosophy and theology (with its concomitant heory of ‘pure nature’) leave 
humanity ‘helpless before the disturbing reality of nihilism’?106 Although he never 
discussed human nature, Heidegger outlined the conditi s for a possible happiness on a 
godforsaken earth. And, Lacoste continues, it was a quote from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
which provided the inspiration for his essay ‘What is thinking?’107 Thinking should 
oppose the growth of that Nietzschean desert. But what is thinking? For Heidegger it 
involved tracing the links between thinking, building and living, between thinking and 
our physical contact with the country lanes along which we (if not necessarily Sartre108) 
walk. But such things do not engender hope.109 And for Lacoste, the Hegelian ‘God’ 
died because it deprived humanity of hope.  
What is at stake in Nietzsche is, Lacoste suggests, a direct consequence of 
Hegelian eschatology. While Nietzsche cared little for either Hegel or his ‘Swabian 
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piety’,110 the affirmation of the ‘eternal return of the same’ is his response to Hegelian 
idealism. Following the death of God:  
life wants to survive, and survive through the work f a will to power to create new values. But 
… the work of the will to power is an endless task: at a time without end and without purpose, 
eternal and folded in on itself. The will to power can never pronounce its last word. It can never 
lead itself to a final experience. It must assert itself with joy.111 
Although it offers us a future, the truth of its being resides in the present – the will-to-
power is founded on neither promise nor hope. Moreover, eschatologies which survive 
the death of God cannot resist the endless claims of the will-to-power.112 This absolute 
future has its own name: the advent of the Übermensch, an early attempt to overcome 
metaphysics – that is, to overcome humanity [dépasser l’homme113] as a metaphyscial 
animal. And history has made us understandably cautious about that so-called 
‘eschatology’. 
Christian theology is, on the other hand, defined by its refusal of any 
quantifiable eschatology. Every other end, however nviable and respectable it might 
be, cannot claim anything more than the status of a ‘penultimate end’: ‘Nothing that the 
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world is home to is eschatologically simpliciter’.114 And because de Lubac never 
pretended to describe ‘the current conditions of this existence’, the theologoumenon he 
rehabilitated leaves the Heideggerian hermeneutics of facticity intact. Is, Lacoste asks, 
the longing for the eschaton – understood as consciu ness-of-desire – really an 
eschatological event? Is the fate of the desideratum to pass incognito among the 
conditions – such as boredom and fatigue – that being-in-the-world dictates to 
experience? 
As someone associated with the post-metaphysical ‘theological turn’ in 
phenomenology, Lacoste is unlikely to assign, as Agamben does, any one thing the 
status of a metaphysical operator; he wishes simply to preserve the ‘formal plurality’115 
in which the world appears. Here phenomena (particularly ‘irregular’ ones such as 
religious phenomena) are either dissolved or subsumed under metaphysical categories; 
the doctrine of pure reason, in its level of abstraction and iterability, ultimately reduces 
humanity to the level of the herd, without a place in the world and susceptible to 
domination by the will-to-power. In the experience of fatigue, in fact, ‘one must trace a 
link from myself to the world or abandon any attempt at explanation’116 and we ‘must 
therefore speak of the world and about fatigue, just as we talk about a world of anguish 
or joy’.117 Christianity, which negotiated the apparent scandal posed by the non-
                                                 
114 ‘Only those realities of which the kingdom of God provides the conceptual figure, and for which the 
resurrection of the flesh (with its corollary in the “beatific vision”) provides the hermeneutic principle.’ 
Lacoste, Le monde et l’absence d’œuvre, p. 35. 
115 ‘The world always appears to us in the formal plurality of worlds, among them the world of fatigue.’ 
Lacoste, Présence et parousie, p. 312. 
116 Ibid., p. 311. 




realization of its eschaton, ‘has precisely the ability to teach humanity how t  exist 
without drama … in an accomplished history, devoid of ontophanic and ontopoetic 
promises’.118 This existence is typically characterised as vigil. 
Vigil and Sleep 
Although Nietzsche counselled ‘wakefulness’119, vigil usually has a specific religious 
significance. A self-declared follower of John of the Cross,120 Lacoste draws upon an 
important liturgical register of ‘night and vigil’.121 Human beings live by day and by 
night. Although sleep, ‘from which the freedom and the intentional acts of 
consciousness are absent, is not a part of life where w  manifest who we are’ this ‘lesser 
mode of existence during the hours we devote to purely physiological operations is 
nevertheless essential to what we are’.122 Only angels ignore sleep – Lacoste reminds us 
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that the Aramaic name for angel is ‘“one who keeps vigil” [“ veilleur”].’ 123 But vigil is 
not our perpetual mode of consciousness: keeping vigil; and sleep, as being-less and as 
indicative of being-less in general reminds us that we are not masters of ourselves: 
‘“life,” in this case, has power over “existence.”’ What, then, asks Lacoste, makes 
someone forego sleep so as to gain time for the vigil? It is a question of the victorious 
protest of ‘existence’ against ‘life’. Life precedes our existence in the world.124  
The animal can suffer sleepless nights or stay awake simply because it is hungry 
or afraid (and human beings can certainly remain awake for the same reasons). But, 
notes Lacoste, there would no sense in saying that an nimal is capable of keeping vigil: 
‘keeping vigil cannot be the object of an obligation; it is something that can only be the 
object of a desideratum. The philosophical importance of the question should not make 
us forget that we do not necessarily invest ourselves in the vigil for the most laudable 
reasons: though we see nothing but futility in his actions, the reveler [fêtard] also keeps 
vigil’. 125 
In struggling to ‘exist’ a little longer ‘the time of vigil is truly our time ... time 
which we gain at the expense of  ... pure biological necessities’; that is, beyond the 
ontological satisfaction of serenity. And although we are not accountable to any 
authority for this time, even our rest has a political dimension: 
                                                 
123 Lacoste wishes to determine the ‘affirmative practice represented by the liturgy’ by specifying ‘a new 
register’ in which its symbolic place lies: ‘in the night and the vigil.’ Ibid., p. 78. ‘[O]ne might be justified 
in affirming that the attention that he devotes to and his expectation of God symbolically assume the 
nocturnal character of the vigil in which, every ethical duty having been honored, man gives to the 
Absolute the time (and thus the being) which he might otherwise have given to sleep.’ 
124 Lacoste, Présence et parousie, p. 163. 




To deliberately deprive me of sleep, or of the sleep n cessary to my good health, would be 
tantamount to abuse; I have the right to expect that the state or the company, except in cases of 
emergency, leave me sufficient time to sleep. The act of keeping vigil appears to us then as the 
purest form of the self positing itself, as the epitome of an affirmation of our freedom.126 
In its decentring of human subjectivity, liturgical time is diverted time (a time of 
inoperativity, time ‘given over’). Boredom, pace Heidegger, reveals that this time can 
also be experienced as wasted time: impatience reappears, wishing to put an end to this 
dead time [temps mort] (to devote it, Lacoste notes sardonically, to ‘an indisputably 
more “interesting” activity, such as theological work’ 127). The bored consciousness 
wastes its time. It might compensate for this wasted time and transform the dialogue it 
would like to establish with God into a soliloquy and thereby retake possession of this 
time.128 This phenomenology of the liturgy suggests that bored m might be a principal 
mood of nocturnal experience. Can man become bored with facing God? As 
provocative as that may seem, the answer must be yes. It would ‘be contradictory for 
man to be completely eschatologically satisfied with the Absolute’.129 The nocturnal 
nonexperience is, however, not eschatological and by ‘precariously distancing himself 
from history, the man who prays signifies and anticipates the accomplishment of this 
history.’130 
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Since God is ‘always greater’ [Deus semper maior] and resists 
conceptualisation, the act of ‘making oneself present’ that inaugurates liturgy cannot 
help being affected by the distance which remains between God (or the Absolute) and 
whoever prays. Liturgical experience is by no means ecstatic.131 As Lacoste argues, 
‘[i]nexperience has no hold over knowledge’ and actu lly permits its rationality – that 
of Schelling and Kierkegaard – to unfold ‘while contradistinguishing itself as clearly as 
possible from religious emotionalism’.132 Nonetheless, it does exert a hold over the 
present, which is therefore not structured primarily by the impatient expectation of some 
promised parousia, or an earthly satisfaction which it has promised itself. Instead, as a 
work of an ascesis (of making oneself present and waiting), one might well understand 
that this time can be one of theologically profound boredom. 133 
Conclusion: The Eschatological Consummation of Fatigue 
Theological reflection upon boredom and fatigue represents a call to impurity:134 an 
end, perhaps, to the distinctions between faith and reason, mind and body, and the 
debate over an elusive ‘pure nature’. It is also recognition of a certain porosity between 
theology and philosophy, at least in the continental tradition. 
It is also an affirmation of life: in contradistinction to Agamben, these are not 
the non-states prior to some unspecified captivation scheduled to be overcome in the 
post-human condition – they are basic and constant conditions of humanity. Subjected 
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to proper philosophical and theological reflection, boredom and fatigue may offer a 
reparative to the reduction of humanity to animality, to nothing more than a herd 
mentality at risk of being dominated by the will-to-p wer. For phenomenology, the 
human form is the foundation of the world’s meaning; for theology, the embodiment of 
God (in the Incarnation) is the basis of the moral and physical integrity of those bodies, 
whose meaning resides in their being in the image of Christ.135 Lacoste’s own post-
Heideggerian analysis suggests that – as Barth sugge ted – boredom is theologically 
constitutive of any coherent anthropology. 
In his recent enquiry into ‘God and Being’, George Pattison makes the 
suggestion that possibility represents ‘a kind of trace of non-being within Being, the 
index of a given entity’s mutability and corruptibil ty and, since possibility is a feature 
of the sublunary world in general, a marker of the world’s falling-short of true 
Being’.136 Thus conceived, the phenomenological attention that boredom and nihility 
receive is due to their capacity to reveal the negative potential of possibility. Unlike his 
friend Jean-Luc Marion – who remains a philosopher of experience, and therefore closer 
to Maurice Blanchot (who writes, like Marion, of anexcess of experience) – Lacoste 
treats religious phenomena as (potentially) inexperienced: ‘It is not necessary for a 
presence to be total for it to delight us ... it can h ppen that anyone or anything that 
delighted us yesterday bores us today (as the angels themselves, according to Origen, 
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were capable of being bored by the presence of God)’.137  
This not only remains truer to the day-to-day experiences of so many believers 
(phenomenologically speaking there is no difference between a congregation after a 
church service than before; indeed, as Lacoste has shown, the most profound mood of 
liturgy is probably boredom) but it allows (liturgical) revelation more room than what 
has already been specified by phenomenology. Michel Henry (another philosopher for 
whom life was pre-eminent) and Lacoste both agree that humanity is not fully 
explicable in terms of worldliness, and wish to construe the human being as one that 
exceeds the strictures of Being-in-the-world. However, unlike Henry, Lacoste insists 
that as flesh and blood humanity never is completely fr e from the strictures of Being-
in-the-world. Here rest and sleep are more than physical necessities; however 
provisional or marginal,138 they represent micro-eschatologies of the kingdom or a 
fleeting ‘taste’139 of happiness to come, brief pauses in a life of vigil. 
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